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People of the same trade seldom meet together,
even for merriment and diversion but the con-
versation ends in a conspiracy against the public,
or in some contrivance to raise prices'
(Adam Smith, 1776/1976,
Wealth of Nations, p 144)
This is an attempt at a comparative analysis of the
political organization of foodgrains markets under
different conditions of agrarian structure and state
regulatory intervention. In particular, the analysis
focuses on the role of collective political activity in
rice markets in three case areas: (i) an arid but long-
commercialized and well-urbanized region of capi-
talist agriculture relying on water control via well
irrigation. The grain market was studied at a time of
considerable state regulation comprising state trad-
ing, storage, processing and controls over the condi-
tions of open market trading (Coimbatore District in
South India in 1979-80 (Harriss 1981, 1984, 1991a));
(ii) a pauperized, inegalitarian and largely rainfed
rizicultural system (that supplying Dhaka, the capi-
tal of Bangladesh in 1988) with state intervention
largely contingent on expectations of market supply
(Harriss 1989) and (iii) a heterogeneous agrarian
region, historically the epicentre of sharecropping,
which has undergone tenurial reform plus reforms
to rural credit and labour markets, where local gov-
ernment has been decentralized and party-politi-
cized but where state regulation of the market is
weakly developed (Bardhama District of West Ben-
gal in 1990 (Harriss 1991b)).
Indian merchants have been characterized as politi-
cal marginalized. Fox's pioneering study in North
India, for instance, concluded that traders were cut
off from the society in which they functioned and
that their political involvement was a) minimal and
b) defensive (Fox 1968). In foodgrains marketing
systems which the early post-Independence research
concluded on the whole to be operating competi-
tively and efficiently, the possibility of collusive
activity (either economic or political) was ruled out
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and therefore not looked for (Cummings 1967;
Jasdanwall 1966; Lele 1971).1 With this empirical
background, we started the comparative project with
three somewhat contradictory hypotheses about
mercantile politics: first, that the state would shape
the space for the politics of market organization - the
greater and more effective the state intervention (as
in Coimbatore) the less the scope for collective action
by merchants; second, that where the ecological
environment is uncertain and hazard-prone (as it is
in Bangladesh and West Bengal) state regulatory
control over merchants trading in the means of
subsistence would be most systematized; third, that
mercantile politics would be limited in its objectives
to the defence of merchants' independence of other
significant social groups, and would be most defen-
sive where agriculture and industry were techno-
logically advanced (as in Coimbatore).
1 THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF SOUTH
ASIAN FOODGRAINS MARKETS: A
CARICATURE
Marketing systems have been relatively under-re-
searched despite, or perhaps because of, their insti-
tutional complexity. While the commodity exchange
relations of producers have been theorized for con-
ditions of inegalitarian peasant agriculture
(Bharadwaj 1974) and of sharecropping (Bhaduri
1983), the institutional attributes of commodity mar-
kets in these models are never specified. In
Bharadwaj's formulation 'the market' is implicitly
competitive and in Bhaduri's it has to consist of a
strategic alliance of landlord, moneylenders and
traders (whose internal conflicts of interest are then
explored).
Yet, far from being a simple layer between produc-
ers and consumers, real grain markets present a
bewildering diversity of institutions, organizational
forms and technical functions. Although these mar-
ket institutions maintain a varying degree of au-
tonomy with respect to forms and institutions of
agriculture production (such that real markets can
I This body of research was conducted on the basis of ideas about the by agricultural economists from industrial organization theory.
relation between structure and behaviourborrowed unsystematicalty
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certainly not be read off deterministically from pro-
duction relations) some of the variation in market
institutions and behaviour is regional and seems a
response not only to the technical requirements of
the crop and the agrarian structure, but also the
specificities and serendipities of distributions of capi-
tal and information and to the actual substance of
state intervention. There is no consensus about the
key features which could shape any characterization
of actually existing grain markets. However, at-
tributes common to all regions compared here in-
clude the following:
i Trade is gendered, with women tending to ap-
pear in two ways. Women from pauperized
households are confined to petty and often sea-
sonal operation, to subsistence orientation and
'simple reproduction', particular positions and
activities within the system (especially process-
ing and retailing), local territorial linkages, weekly
marketplace sites and unlicensed and/or illegal
transactions. Alternatively women are used for
the caste-based reproduction and expansion of
larger firms by means of their dowries on mar-
riage and through their unwaged provision of
that part of the wage to labour in trading firms
which takes the form of prepared food. The
wholesale trade (and its politics) is thus almost
completely male territory.
ii Commodities are far from homogeneous. In
South India, 120 varieties of rice have their prices
tracked, with constrained substitution possibili-
ties and complex, seasonally-changing, spatial
flows. The market for rice is therefore a bundle
of economic markets.
iii A range of organizational forms coexist. These
range from self-employment on a petty and in-
termittent basis through family firms (without or
with wage labour) to joint stock companies via
cooperatives and many types and conditions of
parastatals. The mix of activities in these firms
are extremely diverse. These tendencies towards
uniqueness in activity combinations prevent com-
parative analysis at the level of the firms and
make it impossible to distinguish the returns
from trade from returns generally. Likewise, the
competitive conditions within the post-harvest
production and trading system vary at each of
the multiple states of transfer of property rights.
2 Accumulation by petty firms is also constrained because of higher
per unit trading and transactions costs and because of the relative size
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iv Large numbers of agents conceal a distribution
of mercantile assets combining massive polari-
zation and concentration (Gini assets and output
coefficients of 0.6 - 0.75 are normal - considerably
greater than those for land and production) so
that 'oligopolies', for want of a better word,
coexist with crowded, petty trade. Major entry
barriers to the latter subsector are gender and
caste rather than capital or information, though
there are high and rising barriers of the last sorts
protecting the local oligopolies. Important frac-
tions of petty trade are not independent but tied.
The mercantile oligopolies strive to set the terms
and conditions of accumulation of the petty sec-
tor by relations of finance.2 Small firms are also
dependent on large ones for information, and
physical facilities such as storage, processing
and transport for which rental markets com-
monly evolve.
y Forms of contract range from spot contracts
(very rare, though these are supposedly the price
data collected by the state) through advance
and/or futures agreements (common), through
repeated or relational forms (common and struc-
tured in networks based upon caste or locality) to
internalized transfers within vertically integrated
firms. Contracts are usually verbal except where
state scrutiny is involved, where they are often
written in pencil. Contracts are socially loaded,
in the sense that they may effect the transfer of
rights of control not only over tangible com-
modities, but also over intangibles (loyalty, 'qual-
ity', reliability). Rules of adherence may be
formal and legal or customary.
vi Markets are spatially and socially differentiated.
Common patterns involve periodic markets with
concentrations of petty trade, wholesale markets
with the full range of institutional diversity and
wholesale sites arranged dendritically for re-
gional (occasionally international) export.
vii Average rates of return to marketing hide a great
range which are affected by the extent to which
wage labour is used. Rates of return also vary
with activity combinations. Wherever they have
been compared, however, returns to 'trade' ex-
ceed those from agricultural production, agro
processing and from segments of the informal
money markets.
of the cost component of consumption in the reproduction of the small
firm.
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viii Close links between grain marketing and grain
production in the investment portfolios of mer-
cantile firms. This takes two forms. One is in
which production is controlled directly through
the ownership of land. Though subject to great
variation, the landholding of traders is greater
than in the population as a whole and also likelier
to be rented out. The other linkage leads to an
indirect control over production through
preharvest credit tied to postharvest sales. This
latter can involve several tiers of more or less tied
trading intermediaries who lend onward at higher
(implicit) interest until the post-harvest supplies
of financially dependent producers are captured.
ix Diversified investment portfolios are being cre-
ated by the oligopolistic subsector of merchants
with tendencies towards urban property, finance,
agro processing and commerce itself and much
less commonly in land or industry 'proper'.
Resources are switched in contingent fashion
between the components of such portfolios ren-
dering the calculation of returns to marketing
per se ever more stylized for merchant and ana-
lyst alike.
2 PUBLIC POLICY, PARTY POLITICS AND THE
F000GRAINS TRADES
State intervention in grain markets is not an exogenous
force acting on these markets in a consistent way.
Historically, foodgrains marketing policies have been
characterized by a profound ambivalence and a
clash of political and economic logic. On the one
hand, there are bodies of local regulatory law involv-
ing many departments of government and specify-
ing in fine detail the legal conduct of open markets
(and exacting fees which are often the only light
taxation leviable on the staple foodgrains). These
laws rest on the assumption that such markets are
satisfactorily efficient and competitive and that the
state may perform a minimalist role.
On the other hand, there are marketing cooperatives,
storage corporations and state and central govern-
ment grain trading corporations which manage do-
mestic procurement (and food aid and imports in
Bangladesh), store food reserves and subsidize dis-
3 The details of such accommodations and the political and economic
challenges to them have been set out elsewhere (Harriss 1984).
4 Vysyas are the third caste group in the Hindu order with trade as
their vocation. They are lower in purity than Kshatriyas (warriors)
and Brahmins (priests) and higher than Sudras (cultivators), service
ids bulletin vol 24 no 3 1993
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tribution to shifting targets - on the explicit assump-
tion that markets are so unacceptably uncompetitive
that they require partial replacement.
In practice, state intervention not only carries out
these contradictory functions (with emphases and at
scales which vary over time), it also provides oppor-
tunities for the pervasive extraction of rent at lower
levels of the various food bureaucracies. The mecha-
nisms comprise a plethora of regulatory actions
which maximize the private discretionary power of
state employees at the same time as creating or
exacerbating market price distortions which increase
profits to certain private traders. The majority of
government departments have mandates directly
covering some aspect of agricultural marketing. State
and market are thus enmeshed contradictorily at the
formal level and less contradictorily in practice in a
nexus of interests in the redistribution of the re-
sources appropriated in marketing through a com-
bination of bureaucratic rent and excess profit.3
All our case studies have confirmed Fox's observa-
tion that traders' party political involvement is mini-
mal and fragmented. Both because of the economic
linkages between production and trade within a
market system and because of the extreme heteroge-
neity of market institutions, merchants do not form
a homogeneous social or party-political group, de-
spite their importance to the economy. Political
parties in South Asia are on the whole not class-
based. Nor has a given political party been found to
have a coherent policy on private trade at the local
level at which markets actually exist.
Mercantile politics has at its centre the defence of the
oligopoly. This defence is rarely expressed in party
political alignments, yet there are three responses to
party politics practised by traders. One is to eschew
party political contamination altogether. This is
rarer than suggested by characterizations of mer-
chants as social outsiders influenced by Vysya ethics
of piety and avoidance of obligation.4 The second is
also practised by a minority and consists of the
reverse: active political participation in party poli-
tics, especially in its funding. But this political
support runs across the gamut of parties including
the Communist Parties ('after all Engels owned a
castes and outcastes. But all caste groups except the latter are found
as traders in markets; and outcastes may be found as labourers in
physical contact with paddy in stores, mills and trucks, though much
more rarely with milled rice.
factory') and is nowhere confined to one. The third
response is that of the Vicar of Bray. It consists of
financial support for the ruling party of the day. This
is political opportunism rather than neutrality.
Mercantile political expression takes its most active
form not in party politics but in specialist collective
institutions. It is via trade associations that the
interests of the oligopoly are served. The rest of this
article examines how they work in three different
circumstances.
Southern Tamil Nadu
Grain merchants participate in institutions which
are non-party political in purpose in a much more
active way than they do in party politics, and with an
intensity which bears a general relation to size of
enterprise. Two of these types of institution are
closely associated with the state - cooperatives and
the local panchayats. They are often captured by
merchants of the sort who are also party politically
active. Political conditions then exist for the subor-
dination of state institutions designed to replace
private trade to the interests of private merchants.
Another two types of collective, 'civil-society' insti-
tution are focuses of big merchants' politics. One set
consists of social service institutions (Lions, Rotary
Clubs, Jaycees and the imitative Rotracters, Y's,
Men's clubs, the Inner and Outer Wheels and even
Masonic Lodges) all dedicated to philanthropic and
humanitarian concerns. In fact, their practical activ-
ity consists of acts of particularistic redistributivist
charity which serve to reinforce the prestige in which
large merchants are held by their peers. Social ties
between big grain merchants, local industrialists,
lawyers and bureaucrats evolve out of such social
institutions. This social cement is another factor
conducive to the subordination of the public interest
to those of private merchants. The other set in this
category involves the collective administration of
temples. Not only does such office-holding illus-
trate piety, it also illustrates control over temple
assets such as land and urban property. Since this
property may constitute the physical fabric of the
marketplace, such merchants can exert control over
market entry, over rents (and thus indirectly over
profits of less powerful traders).
While a minority of grain merchants participate in
the institutions discussed so far, commodity associa-
tions are joined by all traders with licences. These
associations are based on locality, with member-
ships ranging from 25 to 150. They were provoked
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into existence in the late 1960s and 1970s for one or
more of three purposes.
First and foremost they represent a deliberate insti-
tutional response by grain merchants to the unioni-
zation of the casual labour necessary to markets.
Merchants have had to develop institutional mecha-
nisms for the negotiation of wage rates and terms
and conditions of work. The relative importance of
this aspect of associational politics depends on local-
ity for not all market places have organized labour.
The casual female labour force (fluid, working inter-
mittently, dispersed in terms of origin) is not organ-
ized anywhere - outside the scope of political party
activists, a condition very convenient to merchants.
Negotiations are subtle because merchants, organ-
ized by commodity, confront workers stratified by
job type (cutting across commodity lines) and organ-
ized into a series of unions by several competing
political parties.
The second raison d'etre of commodity associations
is the defence of their markets from 'threat' (regula-
tion) by the state. Such 'threats' include i) the nature
of the regulatory agenda e.g. exaction of Regulated
Market fees, the imposition of movement restric-
tions, levies or quota sales to the state distribution
system at prices less than those 'ruling', ii) the way
in which such regulations are implemented e.g.
harassment by the vigilance forces at roadside excise
checkposts, absence of consultation by state institu-
tions over milling rates, outturn standards of rice
from paddy, and wages to be paid by millers on
contract to the state and iii) penalties imposed for
evasion of the regulatory laws e.g. for unlicensed
operation, for storage in excess of limits on quantity
or periodicity or for defiance of the welfare provi-
sions of the Labour Laws.
Here politics operates through lobbying and there is
the possibility, through hierarchical federations, of
lobbying up to the highest political levels, though in
the region studied this was rare. Lobbying is most
usually local and aimed at the political apparatus,
the fragmented executive administration of the state
and parastate, the police and judiciary. Grain mer-
chants rarely mobilize when policy is formulated,
working instead on the process of policy implemen-
tation. Their lobbying may be rhetorical and persua-
sive or involve financial transfers; it may be
oppositional or it may actually be collaborative de-
pending on very precise circumstances. In this
process, technically illegal privileges and conces-
sions may be won, some of which may benefit all
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members but some of which can often be gained
individually, with the association manipulated as a
legitimating label and with conflict between the
collective private interest and the private interest of
individual traders (which generates its own poli-
tics). While the political activity of small associa-
tions may be intermittent and dominant for long
periods of time, that of the apex institutions at the
state level is continuous. The instability of many
aspects of market regulation would seem very con-
sistent with this type of politics.
The third type of challenge to mercantile power here
is from agricultural capital. This has often been
expressed in well organized, agitational forms, by
capitalist farmers who conscript the mass of the
peasantry, appealing to the state not only for amor-
tization on overdue electricity bills, for increased
inputs subsidies and infrastructural concessions but
also for reforms to 'the market'. Here the conflict of
interests of landed merchants who are also members
of such farmers' movements has the potential to be
debilitating to the latter. Reforms to commodity
markets have been less successfully wrested from
the state by organized farmers than have subsidies
on agricultural inputs supplied by state adminis-
tered institutions (such as surface irrigation, credit
and electricity) because of the organized opposition
of merchants' associations whose leading members
may be landed and therefore may be active in agri-
cultural protest.
Thus in Coimbatore District we found the marketing
system to be a sizable, defended, political interface
between agriculture and industry within the food
economy. In addition, merchants' collective institu-
tions defend their interests against challenges by
labour and encroachments from the state. In partici-
pating and controlling a range of other institutions of
civil society, big merchants can exert regulatory
pressure over the market behaviour of smaller firms.
Grain merchants are organized so as to influence in
their own interests any level of the state polity and
even the actions of rival lobbies. They have done so
with demonstrable success.
The Dhaka Region of Bangladesh
Grain merchants within Bangladesh's capital city
have been in the process of being organized for
much longer than they have in rural South India.
Yet, there are considerable similarities between these
extremely contrasting conditions in their forms of
mercantile politics: in their size and organization on
the basis of locality; in the universality of their
ids bulletin vol 24 no 3 1993
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membership (in Dhaka the Hindu minority is com-
pletely represented just as the Muslim minority is
represented in the predominantly Hindu region of
Coimbatore); in the tendency for opportunistic po-
litical alignments: in the prominence (if not the
domination) of grain merchants in institutions of
local government, social and cultural institutions; in
their predisposition to philanthropic display and in
their lobbying of government to the highest levels of
which they have easy and informal access. There is
abundant evidence (Harriss 1989; Crow and Murshid
1991) pointing not to a conflict of interests between
state and market but rather to a consensus of bureau-
cratic and commercial interests in the
misimplementation of regulatory intervention, eco-
nomic mechanisms of which operate both collec-
tively and individually. The administration benefits
from bureaucratic rent. Consider for an example,
the Food Department's mill gate procurement policy,
started in 1985 where 'influence' was used by organ-
ized merchants in the negotiation of paddy-rice
conversion ratios ensuring very high private re-
turns. Individual local officials are then paid by
individual millers at several points: j) in order to
obtain the milling agreement with the Food Depart-
ment; ii) at the moment of issue of a Weight Quality
Storage Certificate; and iii) to obtain repayment by
the Food Department for milling for state distribu-
tion. But 'there is an institutionalized distribution of
the returns from these charges' widely within the
local offices and up to District Headquarters. There
is a nationwide auction for the post of District Com-
missioner of Food in one of the food surplus areas of
Bangladesh (Crow and Murshid 1991: 95). Traders
and millers in turn derive profit from price distor-
tions engendered by such forms of policy imple-
mentation. Here however we will focus on the
dissimilarities between the associational politics of
rural Coimbatore and urban Dhaka.
The self-styled Merchants' Trades Unions were not
created reactively in response to the political organi-
zation of their labour forces. Instead collective
action became necessary because of labour prob-
lems resulting from the different way in which
labour is organized in grain marketing: particularly
because of opportunistic transactions by itinerant
traders, networks of whom have been customarily
attached to single wholesalers.
Nor have the associations been provoked so much
by state regulation, though this is undoubtedly a
reason for their current strength. By contrast the
administration found the existence of such associa-
tions positively useful as a mechanism by which it
can inform and exert pressure on private trade. This
is especially necessary in a hazard-prone ecological
environment. That there is yet no federation of
associations to facilitate this task - no collective chain
of command and considerable ignorance about the
modus operandi of other associations - may be seen
as a form of institutional retaliation on the part of
merchants. This unfederated lobbying is directed
less at economic aspects of market regulation than in
Coimbatore and more at costs and risks caused by
physically disrupted utilities.
The political muscle of coolies (the manual labour
force of marketplaces) has grown only latterly. The
struggle over surplus between organized merchants
and organized labour (the formalization of which
began earlier in India though is still far from com-
plete) is only just starting in certain market places in
the Dhaka region. Wage rates to labour are fixed by
the merchants' associations but handed down by fiat
to labourers. Negotiations about prices are more
focused on lorry and boat rates. Operators of trans-
port are well organized and transport is far more
underdeveloped and uncertain in Bangladesh than it
is in South India.
The organization of these associations is less
participative than in Coimbatore with activity cón-
centrated in the hand of inner committees of traders
who are rarely elected for this job but who form
networks of the economically powerful. At the same
time grain associations in Dhaka are more struc-
tured than in Coimbatore and involve employed
staff and specialist premises. The funding of mer-
cantile associations by monthly subscription is more
systematic and on a relatively much larger scale in
the Dhaka region than in Coimbatore District.
More strikingly and related to the scale of funding of
these associations, while law and order activities are
rarely carried out by the Indian associations, they are
routine and important functions of the grain mer-
chants' associations in Dhaka. Arbitration of dis-
putes is the main means by which associations im-
pose order. Commonest disputes involve default on
credit advances, non-customary undercutting, the
use of false weights and measures and crime and loss
in transport. Methods such as publicity, abuse and
shaming are deployed. The associations can enforce
compliance by threats to block all other transactions
by the offender. They can also evict offenders. The
Dhaka rice marketplaces are sites for a compara-
tively high incidence of robbery, violence and riot-
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ous behaviour. In the absence of adequate police
support, grain associations have organized their
own security forces.
Formidable local power is thus held by grain mer-
chants but there are limits fo their collective action.
No association has succeeded in systematizing bank
credit for trade so that loans are reported by the
merchants concerned to be cornered by the very
largest merchants. Private payments to officials of
the food and income tax departments and the licens-
ing authorities were reported to be individualized.
Terms and conditions of contracts are intensely and
competitively individualized.
So, despite the critical role played by grain in this
economy and the hazardous conditions under which
it is distributed, the regulatory capacity of the state in
Bangladesh appears to be more limited than it is in
those parts of India where the grain lobby has previ-
ously been examined. Even the minimum role of the
state in guaranteeing contract and physical security,
without which markets cannot function, rests on
more fragile foundations in Bangladesh. Merchants
in Dhaka have to channel their collective political
energy into the basic activities of security, the reso-
lution of disputes, the speeding of prosecution by
the official forces of law and order and, by default,
the organization of private forces of security. The
notable lack of an association of associations in-
creases the friction with which the state manipulates
these collective institutions. At times of the flood or
other crisis, the head of state has to bargain directly
with each association. But the associations are ma-
nipulated in turn by powerful individual merchants
so that a system of corruption and excess profiteering
has been cemented.
Rural West Bengal
In Bardhaman District of West Bengal, the collective
activity of merchants is dominated by the need for a
different prerequisite to marketing than physical
security. This is the state provision of regulation.
Although a Regulated Agricultural Markets Act stipu-
lating the terms and conditions for the first transac-
tion between producer and trader has been enacted
in West Bengal as in all other states of India, it has
never been implemented. West Bengal's agricul-
tural markets are nevertheless quite densely regu-
lated by means of a mass of laws and enforcement
mechanisms involving a number of different gov-
ernment departments (Revenue, Cooperation, Agri-
culture, Social Welfare and Local Government, etc.).
However, as with the Regulated Markets Acts else-
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where in the subcontinent, these laws are also hardly
ever implemented as laid down. They are trans-
formed beyond recognition in implementation. They
can be completely ignored. They can be creatively
reinterpreted by verbal renegotiation to the mutual
advantage of bureaucrats and traders (for example
the cases of paddy and rice procurement from mill-
ers by state trading corporations, and the restriction
of 'formal' sector credit to biggest merchants). They
may be flouted by the powerful and imposed on the
weak (for example, the capture of the potato crop by
cold store owners; the use of rationing of licences to
oppress unlicensed traders by bribery to officials
and usurious moneylending to hapless unlicensed
merchants). They may be used to regulate behav-
iour by threat backed by a very occasional penaliza-
tion. Finally, the implementation of these laws may
be the basis of the preemptive evolution of market-
ing systems (as in the casualization of labour to
avoid the Factories Acts obligations). They are
implemented so as to create a system of diffused
appropriation of bureaucratic rent by individuals
and sometimes by networks scattered through the
majority of departments.
The institutional means whereby grain markets are
regulated is actually diverse. The state plays a
negligible role. Regulation is underdeveloped.
Norms for marketing (such as weights and meas-
ures) are not completely standardized. Property
rights are less secure than in South India. Regulation
is either privately and individually organized where
costly externalities can be internalized (as with secu-
rity, hygiene and crime detection) or institutional-
ized collectively.
Very recently, there has mushroomed a meso level
set of associational institutions in the political space
between marketing firms and the state. As we have
seen with the other case studies, they have been
brought into existence to respond in a collective way
to representations from collective labour institutions
and to these regulations of the state. But they also
perform crucial regulating functions within their
commodity markets as well as other overlapping
activity. In a rather disorganized way, structured
both by locality and by position in the marketing
system, these collective institutions organize:
i ownership of market sites as the collective prop-
erty of the association;
ii exploiting scale economies (e.g. in transport,
guarding, waste disposal);
ids bulletin vol 24 no 3 1993
60
iii putting up entry barriers against non members;
iv colluding over prices;
y risk spreading and insurance (e.g. cases of inter-
est free group credit and group insurance by
subscription for accident, calamity, fraud or
legal expenses);
vi physical security and a tolerable public health
environment in marketplaces;
vii reduction in the transactions costs associated
with trading (information not just in the form of
pertinent facts about prices but about produc-
tion, supply, important transactions, fraud and
delinquency (the circulation of which is con-
fined to the group); calibration of weights and
measures, dispute resolution and enforcement);
viii reduction of uncertainty on related or derived
markets (collective negotiation of advantageous
set maximum rates - for labour, transport and
processing);
ix expressions of social coherence, philanthropy
and piety.
The performance of grain markets regulated in such
a way judged by price integration analysis (Palaskas
and Harriss 1991) is inefficient in the short term.
Spatial price margins far exceed transport costs.
Paddy and rice price differentials far exceed process-
ing costs.
Not all of these groups are lawful. Nor are all of
them durable. Associations which have failed have
done so for reasons of adverse selection (as when the
costs of including illegal mills have destroyed the
financial base) or reasons of opportunistic behav-
iour and co-variate risk (which destroyed a traders'
credit association). It is the weakest agents in this
marketing system who are unable to organize (petty
paddy-rice processors, female retailers, unlicensed
husking millers): 'we are always in fear and cannot
group'.
It can be concluded from this case study that where
the state is unable to or unwilling to implement
regulatory laws, civil society institutions step in to
perform this function, but with little evidence to date
of efficiency and a lot more evidence of institutional
conflict and of the exercise of coercion against those
deliberately excluded.
3 CONCLUSION
In contradistinction to Fox's conclusion and to the
impression to be gained from their party political
participation, merchants - at least these gram mer-
chants - have been found to be far from politically
marginal. Pace Smith, they conspire to a great deal
more than the raising of prices. Their apparently
fragmented institutional allegiances disguise politi-
cal linkages which enable the mercantile elite both
individually and collectively to organize the terms of
market participation of smaller traders.
The hypotheses about politics with which we em-
barked proved to be inadequate. From the three case
studies it can be seen that under conditions of rela-
tively effective state regulation, it is not the case that
there is less scope for organizational politics. The
associations in South India bore down on all policy
tendrils seeking to curb their power. Here we also
saw these collective institutions defending merchants'
interests against labour and against agricultural pro-
ducers. Secondly, where the ecological environment
is uncertain and both it and the economy are hazard
prone, state control over staple food merchants was
expected to be most systematic. That this is not the
case testifies to the relative power of private traders.
It also means that merchants have to engage in DIY
- in Bangladesh organizing their own security and in
West Bengal organizing their own regulation. Lastly,
we did indeed find mercantile politics to be defen-
sive, both literally and institutionally in Bangladesh
and most defensive in Coimbatore, but this was due
not so much to the political organization of agricul-
tural and industrial producers as to the political and
economic irritations of organized labour and the
existence of a more effective regulating state. We
have seen however that the organized political activ-
ity of merchants operates with more complex tactics
than defence alone.
Grain merchants in South Asia have organized them-
selves collectively in reaction to challenges tending
to come from three sources: the unionization of
labour; regulatory activity by the state; and the need
for autoregulation in the absence of effective state
regulation in the context of the development of long
distance interregional trade. While the intentional-
ity of such collective institutions cannot be in doubt,
their malleability has also become evident. Once
brought into existence, traders' organizations can
develop a variety of new political roles according to
circumstance.
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Institutional economists such as Williamson would
argue that such organizations are efficient ways of
minimizing transactions costs in markets (1985).
This unverifiable ex post rationalization overlooks
the price inefficiency of markets regulated like this,
the deployment of collective institutions as political
mechanisms not only for the collective private eco-
nomic interest but also for the individual private
interest and their coercive penalization of those ex-
cluded. In the reactive, defensive politics which
builds up around these collective institutions, mer-
cantile power also extends into other institutions of
municipal and local government, religion, educa-
tion, culture and social welfare.
Civil-society institutions in private markets play a
distinctly ambivalent role. Markets cannot develop
without them, yet they simultaneously restrict entry
and institutionalize distribution in ways which may
not be desired by the mass of society. Their opera-
tion causes the state to become more accountable but
accountable to merchants. Any attempt by the state
to intervene in markets has to deal with the political
fact of these collective institutions. A developmental
state might not wish to leave regulation entirely in
the hands of these institutions for the very good
reasons that their penalties on outsiders are often
oppressive and extralegal, and that they function to
protect their own interests in highly differentiated
market structures. They are quite capable of pre-
venting the organization of weaker intermediaries.
So, lastly, a social engineering question which is
extremely important in the context of the 'deregula-
tion' accompanying structural adjustment clamours
for consideration. How to maximize the benefits
from mercantile collective institutions while reduc-
ing the social costs of mercantile collective action.
Two responses suggest themselves, though
residualizing the issue of the means of improving
both state and social accountability (which is what is
involved in such responses) feels distinctly irrespon-
sible.
First, state trading and storage institutions and coop-
eratives do not have a distinguished track record of
regulating private markets by means of competition.
From the evidence presented here we would not
construct a case for the expansion of state interven-
tion even though it is now easier to see how one
might be argued. It is more fruitful to examine the
scope for reform of the regulatory laws which at
least on paper enshroud private markets. In the case
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of markets, the law needs to be implementable. The
detail of such reform is well outside the scope of this
discussion, but certain elements can be outlined:
reforms to reduce the at present intense specificity of
the trading conduct deemed to be lawful and instead
to delineate transactions that are unlawful, thereby
legitimating a broader transactional space; a sys-
tematized and centralized system of administration,
taxation and enforcement to replace the multiple,
diffuse and localized ones existing now; laws and
rules which operate via positive incentives rather
than negative strictures; improvements to specifica-
tion at the boundaries, where one set of rules, such as
that for private markets meets others, such as those
for state trading or commercial taxation.
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